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SOUNDS OF SCIENCE: COPYRIGHT 





The music business is no stranger to disruptive technology.  The industry’s 
apparent comeback from the devastating downturn caused by illegal file 
sharing seems to have arrived just in time for what may be an even more 
disruptive technological phenomenon: artificial intelligence (“AI”).  Much has 
been said about the implications of AI-generated music, ranging from issues of 
ownership, to rights of publicity.  However, there has been surprisingly little 
discussion of infringement in the AI systems’ outputs.  By examining the 
functionality of AI music generators through the lens of de minimis use case 
law, this paper will explain how the outputs of AI music generators potentially 
infringe the exclusive reproduction right granted to musical work and sound 
recording copyright owners.  Going forward, courts and policymakers must not 
ignore AI’s capacity to undermine our incentives for human authorship, and 
craft rules that promote a mutually beneficial AI music ecosystem for 
technology companies and copyright owners alike. 
                                                          
∗ J.D., 2021, American University Washington College of Law; B.A., Organizational 
Communications, 2010, Miami University (OH). I would like to thank Robert Kasunic at the 
United States Copyright Office for providing invaluable guidance and feedback on this 
Comment, and Shannon Sorensen at the National Music Publishers’ Association for 
introducing me to the subject of generative AI. I would also like to thank Jonas Anderson 
and Michael Carroll at the Washington College of Law for helping shape my understanding 
of copyright law, and everyone at The Catholic University Journal of Law and Technology 
for their assistance with this Comment. Finally, I am endlessly grateful to my parents for 
always encouraging me to explore my love for music; I could not have written this 
Comment without their love, patience, and support. 
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“Now here we go dropping science, dropping it all over / like bumping around 
the town like when you’re driving a Range Rover / expanding the horizons and 
expanding the parameters / expanding the rhymes of sucker M.C. amateurs”1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The music industry is no stranger to disruptive technology.  Indeed, 
litigation following the ascendance of illegal file sharing services helped 
dramatically shape a cornerstone of modern US secondary liability 
jurisprudence.2  However, for the music industry, the damage had already been 
done.3  Music sales and licensing revenue plunged by more than half in the 
first decade of the twenty-first century,4 making the industry’s rebound5 in 
recent years more cause for cautious optimism than celebration.6 
The music business’ supposed comeback seems to have arrived just in time 
for what may be an even more disruptive technological phenomenon: the 
proliferation of artificial intelligence (“AI”).7  As applied to music, AI has 
been met with intrigue and enthusiasm.8  However, courts and policymakers 
must be careful not to overlook the potentially devastating impacts that this 
novel technology could have on human authorship. 
                                                          
 1 BEASTIE BOYS, Sounds of Science, on PAUL’S BOUTIQUE (Capitol Records 1989). 
 2 See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 913–914 (2005) (establishing 
a rule whereby those who “intentionally induce. . .” copyright infringement may be held 
secondarily liable); see also A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011, 1029 (9th 
Cir. 2001) (finding Napster liable for contributory infringement and vicarious liability, 
ultimately leading to the service’s demise in 2002). 
 3 See Stephen Dowling, Napster Turns 20: How It Changed the Music Industry, BBC 
(May 31, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/culture/article/20190531-napster-turns-20-how-it-
changed-the-music-industry (describing the peer-to-peer file sharing model as “an industry-
destroying genie” that Napster “released. . . from the bottle forever”). 
 4 See David Goldman, Music’s Lost Decade: Sales Cut in Half, CNN (Feb. 3, 2020), 
https://money.cnn.com/2010/02/02/news/companies/napster_music_industry/ (graphing the 
precipitous loss in music industry revenue from 1999 to 2009). 
 5 See IFPI Global Music Report 2019, IFPI (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.ifpi.org/ifpi-
global-music-report-2019/ (reporting the fourth consecutive year of recorded music market 
growth in 2019). 
 6 See Bill Hochberg, The Record Business is Partying Again, But Not Like It’s 1999, 
FORBES (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/williamhochberg/2019/04/11/the-
record-business-is-coming-back-but-its-not-1999-yet/?sh=55811de03257 (“[r]eports of a 
full recovery by the record business may be exaggerated.”). 
 7 See Gideon Lewis-Kraus, The Great A.I. Awakening, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Dec. 14, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/14/magazine/the-great-ai-awakening.html 
(detailing the evolution of modern AI applications and how they have transformed Silicon 
Valley). 
 8 See Alex Marshall, From Jingles to Pop Hits, A.I. is Music to Some Ears, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/22/arts/music/jukedeck-artificial-
intelligence-songwriting.html (suggesting AI could change the way we listen to music). 
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Much has been said about the legal implications of AI music generators,9 
ranging from issues of ownership10 to rights of publicity,11 but there has been 
surprisingly little discussion of infringements in the AI systems’ outputs.  The 
limited speculation on this question remains largely inconclusive in the popular 
literature.12  Accordingly, courts and policymakers will be forced to address 
output infringements as AI music becomes increasingly sophisticated in the 
coming years.13 
By examining the technical workings of AI music generators through the 
lens of de minimis use case law, this Comment will explain how AI music 
generator outputs potentially infringe the rights of music copyright holders.  
Specifically, by up-sampling copyrighted works in finely encoded segments, 
AI music generators create tapestries of coherent audio from the works they 
ingest in training, thereby infringing the United States Copyright Act’s 
reproduction right.14  This moment presents an opportunity for technology 
companies and the music industry to avoid repeating past mistakes by 
addressing this new disruptive technology as partners, rather than opponents. 
                                                          
 9 See generally Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap, 51 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 399 (2017) (outlining the modern AI policy debate). 
 10 See Jane C. Ginsburg & Luke Ali Budiardio, Authors and Machines, 34 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 343, 417–19 (2019) (suggesting the user of a generative machine who supplies 
“some creative influence over the expressive contents of the resulting work” ought to have 
authorship of the resulting work with the machine’s designer); see also James 
Grimmelmann, There’s No Such Things as Computer-Authored Work – And It’s a Good 
Thing, Too, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 403, 403 (2016) (emphasizing how U.S. copyright law 
does not recognize computer programs as authors); Pamela Samuelson, Allocating 
Ownership Rights in Computer-Generated Works, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1185, 1227–28 
(1986) (endorsing vestment of rights in the AI user as being the “most practicable solution” 
to the issue of AI-output ownership); but see Margot E. Kaminski, Authorship, Disrupted: 
AI Authors In Copyright and First Amendment Law, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 589, 614 (2017) 
(explaining how disruption of “romantic [i.e., human] authorship” in copyright and First 
Amendment law predates the emergence of AI, thereby situating computer-authored works 
within the bounds of U.S. copyright law); Annemarie Bridy, The Evolution of Authorship: 
Work Made by Code, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 395, 401 (2016) (arguing that recognition of 
authorship in non-natural persons is consistent with first principles because U.S. copyright 
law is predicated on “the protection of economic rather than moral rights”). 
 11 See, e.g., Bobby Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for 
Privacy, Democracy, and National Security, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1753, 1788–1804 (2019) 
(contrasting the costs and benefits of “deep fakes,” and proposing a combination of civil and 
criminal penalties for abusers of this AI-powered technology). 
 12 See, e.g., Dani Deahl, We’ve Been Warned About AI and Music for Over 50 Years, 
But No One’s Prepared, VERGE (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/4/17/ 
18299563/ai-algorithm-music-law-copyright-human (describing challenges facing the legal 
system with regard to AI music as “a total legal cluster[expletive].”). 
 13 See, e.g., id. (discussing AI’s potential ability to work endlessly and mimic current 
artists). 
 14 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2020) (reserving to the copyright owner the exclusive right to 
“reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords”). 
188 THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY [Vol. 29.2 
 JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 
Part I of this paper will offer a primer on AI and machine learning to explain 
how the technology is currently being applied to music generation.  Part II will 
discuss the two copyrights that exist in every song and the state of the law as it 
pertains to de minimis use of works protected by those copyrights.  Part III of 
this paper will apply the case law discussed in Part II to AI music generators, 
arguing that under current law, AI music generators likely engage in pervasive 
copyright infringement.  Finally, Part III will conclude by considering the 
long-term implications of adopting a permissive stance toward AI music 
generators, and it will propose potential policy solutions that could engender a 
more mutually beneficial AI music ecosystem. 
I. MACHINE LEARNING & AI MUSIC 
AI has the world abuzz.  Already, AI has proven itself capable of 
performing intelligent tasks ranging from language processing15 to cancer 
detection.16  It should come as no surprise, then, that researchers have also 
been working to refine AI’s utility to the creative process – an area that has 
also seen tremendous progress.17  Considering the pace of creative AI systems 
development, courts and policymakers must properly assess how generative AI 
figures into existing legal frameworks, which first requires an understanding of 
how AI functions. 
Part I.A will describe the subfield of AI research known as machine-
learning, and it will explain how it has transformed the prospects for 
sophisticated AI applications.  Part I.B will then discuss how AI music 
generators employ machine learning to generate new musical compositions and 
sound recordings. 
A. Machine Learning  
AI is a broad classification ascribed to several approaches to computer 
science research on the subject of a machine’s capacity to act intelligently.18  
Modern AI research began in the 1950s, inspired by the hypothesis that the 
                                                          
 15 See Lewis-Kraus, supra note 7. 
 16 See Neil Savage, How AI is Improving Cancer Diagnostics, NATURE (Mar. 25, 2020), 
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-00847-2 (describing how AI “can spot subtle 
patterns that can easily be missed by humans.”). 
 17 See The Quest for AI Creativity, IBM, https://www.ibm.com/watson/advantage-
reports/future-of-artificial-intelligence/ai-creativity.html (last visited May 16, 2021) 
(celebrating IBM Watson’s successful creation of a movie trailer). 
 18 STUART J. RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A MODERN 
APPROACH 1 (3d ed. 2010). 
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learning process could be effectively replicated with computers.19  Early AI 
research primarily dealt with training computers to make intelligent choices 
(e.g., moves in a game of checkers) by programming the system with an 
internal feedback loop that allowed it to independently learn the result of each 
decision it made.20  However, this approach proved untenable when the vast 
number of potential outcomes became too great for the system to comprehend 
on its own.21 
In the 1980s, machine learning emerged as a subfield of AI research 
grounded in statistics and mathematics.22  Machine learning represented a vast 
improvement over prior approaches to AI systems development for its use of 
multi-layer neural networks.23  Neural networks are algorithms designed to 
mirror the human brain’s learning processes.24  Two popular neural network-
based approaches to machine learning are generative adversarial networks 
(“GANs”) and autoencoders.25 
GANs are a relatively new approach to using neural networks in generative 
AI systems development.26  GANs use two machine-learning models: one that 
generates output at random to reflect the user’s command (the “generator”); the 
other, a model that uses a pre-programmed dataset to critique the generator’s 
output (the “discriminator”).27  This feedback process is conducted reciprocally 
until the discriminator can better detect the generator’s fake outputs, and the 
generator can reliably pass the discriminator’s authenticity test.28  As a result, 
the GANs become capable of producing highly realistic outputs, but they often 
fail to capture the full extent of the discriminator’s data distribution.29 
                                                          
 19 See C. E. Shannon et al., A Proposal for the Dartmouth Summer Research Project on 
Artificial Intelligence, 27 AI MAGAZINE 4, 12 (1955) (proposing the first study into AI 
systems development on the basis “that every aspect of learning or any other feature of 
intelligence can in principle be so precisely described that a machine can be made to 
simulate it.”). 
 20 M. Tim Jones, A Beginner’s Guide to Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, and 
Cognitive Computing, IBM: DEVELOPER (June 1, 2017), https://developer.ibm.com/ 
articles/cc-beginner-guide-machine-learning-ai-cognitive/#machine-learning. 
 21 See id. (using as an example a game of tic-tac-toe: “[a]t the start of the game there are 
nine possible moves . . . The full tree of moves for tic-tac-toe contains . . . 362,880 nodes.”). 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Chris Nicholson, A Beginner’s Guide to Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs), 
PATHMIND, https://wiki.pathmind.com/generative-adversarial-network-gan (last visited May 
16, 2021). 
 26 See Ian J. Goodfellow et al., Generative Adversarial Nets, ARXIV (June 10, 2014), 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1406.2661.pdf (proposing the GAN as a new framework for estimating 
generative models in 2014). 
 27 Nicholson, supra note 25. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Sander Dieleman, Generating Music in the Waveform Domain, GITHUB (Mar. 24, 
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Another noteworthy neural network that takes a different approach to 
generative modeling is the autoencoder.30  Autoencoders ingest input data, 
compress them into discrete coded segments, and then attempt to reconstruct 
the input data through a decoding process.31  By examining discrepancies 
between the input and output layers, the system can refine its encoding process 
to extract only the input data’s most relevant elements.32  The goal is to 
strengthen the network’s ability to independently encode large datasets, such 
that those encoded segments can be subsequently used to generate 
unrecognizable, authentic-sounding outputs.33 
GANs and autoencoders represent two promising approaches to using neural 
networks for creative expression.34  One of the most remarkable uses of neural 
networks to date is in the creation of deepfakes,35 which have been put to both 
comical36 and potentially nefarious37 uses.  Recent breakthroughs in AI music 
generator research suggest that neural networks may have a similarly profound 
effect on the future of music creation and consumption.38  The next subsection 
will explore the ways that neural networks are being applied to artificial music 
generation. 
                                                                                                                                      
2020), https://benanne.github.io/2020/03/24/audio-generation.html#fnref:pixelcnn. 
 30 Autoencoder, DEEPAI, https://deepai.org/machine-learning-glossary-and-
terms/autoencoder (last visited May 16, 2021). 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 See id. (explaining that autoencoders could theoretically generate an image of, e.g., a 
flying housecat, based solely on the system’s refined codes for inputs like “houses” and 
“flying”). 
 34 Id. 
 35 See Grace Shao, What ‘Deepfakes’ Are and How They Are Dangerous, CNBC, 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/14/what-is-deepfake-and-how-it-might-be-dangerous.html 
(last updated Jan. 17, 2020) (explaining that deepfakes are artificial videos made through 
deep learning processes designed to believably simulate the appearance and vocal 
characteristics of real individuals). 
 36 See Andy Baio, With Questionable Copyright Claim, Jay-Z Orders Deepfake Audio 
Parodies Off YouTube, WAXY (Apr. 28, 2020), https://waxy.org/2020/04/jay-z-orders-
deepfake-audio-parodies-off-youtube/ (describing videos posted to YouTube containing 
“Bill Clinton reciting ‘Baby Got Back,’” and “JFK touting the intellectual merits of Rick 
and Morty.”). 
 37 See Kaylee Fagan, A Viral Video That Appeared to Show Obama Calling Trump a 
‘Dips—’ Shows a Disturbing New Trend Called ‘Deepfakes’, INSIDER (Apr. 17, 2018), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/obama-deepfake-video-insulting-trump-2018-4 
(explaining that widely available deepfake software has already been used to believably 
mimic the likeness of prominent political figures, and to insert celebrity faces into 
pornographic videos). 
 38 See Marshall, supra note 8 (speculating that AI will change the way we listen to 
music by eventually enabling computers to compose music responsively while “[playing] a 
game,” or “going for a run,”). 
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B. AI Music 
Applying AI technology to music is nothing new.  Automatic music 
generation can be traced back to the earliest days of AI research.39  Further, AI 
already aides the modern music industry by performing functions ranging from 
talent discovery40 to playlist curation.41 
However, the last few years have constituted a renaissance in machine-
learning music generation.42  Leading technology companies like Google43 and 
IBM44 have thrown their hats into the machine-learning music space.  Even 
anonymous AI hobbyists have used homemade algorithms to catch the 
attention of international superstars (or, more accurately, their lawyers).45 
Among the most novel developments in machine-learning music generation 
has been the practice of training generative AI models on large corpora of raw 
audio.46  This approach allows the model to account for nuances in recorded 
music (e.g., timbre, dynamics, etc.) that cannot be discovered in inherently 
limited symbolic training material.47  When trained on enough raw audio, the 
                                                          
 39 See L. A. Hiller, Jr. & L. M. Isaacson, Musical Composition with a High-Speed 
Digital Computer, 6 J. AUDIO ENG’G SOC. 154, 154–160 (1958) (reporting on the 
development of a technique for “writing music by means of automatic high-speed digital 
computers”). 
 40 See Ryan Middleton, Industry Focus: ASAII Co-Founder, Austin Chen Talks Using 
Data A&R Hidden Talent, MAGNETIC MAG., https://www.magneticmag.com/2017/10/ 
industry-focus-asaii-co-founder-austin-chen-talks-using-data-a-r-hidden-talent/ (last updated 
Aug. 22, 2018) (profiling Asaii, a new company that uses AI to discover hidden talent). 
 41 See Jonathan Vanian, How A.I. is Playing a Bigger Role in Music Streaming Than 
You Ever Imagined, FORTUNE (Oct. 1, 2020), https://fortune.com/2020/10/01/sonos-spotify-
iheartradio-artificial-intelligence/ (examining AI’s application to listener trend analysis). 
 42 See Andrew R. Chow, There’s a Wide-Open Horizon of Possibility.’ Musicians Are 
Using AI to Create Otherwise Impossible New Songs, TIME (Feb. 5, 2020), 
https://time.com/5774723/ai-music/. 
 43 See Aaron van den Oord & Sander Dieleman, WaveNet: A Generative Model for Raw 
Audio, DEEPMIND (Sept. 8, 2016), https://deepmind.com/blog/article/wavenet-generative-
model-raw-audio (introducing WaveNet, a generative model capable of synthesizing audio 
signals like human voice and music). 
 44 See Kelly Shi, Beats By AI, IBM: RES. PROJECTS BLOG (July 27, 2016), 
https://www.ibm.com/blogs/research/2016/07/beats-by-ai/ (introducing Watson Beat, a 
cognitive technology trained to understand the nuances and characteristics of all thirty music 
keys). 
 45 See Baio, supra note 36 (reporting that Roc Nation filed a takedown notice with 
YouTube alleging copyright infringement in two deepfake videos created by “training a 
model with a large corpus of . . . Jay-Z songs and lyrics”). 
 46 See Prafulla Dhariwal et al., Jukebox, OPENAI (Apr. 30, 2020), https://openai.com/ 
blog/jukebox/ (introducing Jukebox, a neural net that generates music as raw audio using a 
model trained on a dataset of 1.2 million songs taken from the web). 
 47 Id. A critical shortcoming of previous generative models was their reliance on 
symbolic representations like musical instrument digital interface (“MIDI”) files. MIDI is a 
communications protocol that essentially functions as a digital signal that instructs 
electronic instruments on which sounds to produce. Like piano rolls that instruct player 
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model can generate music closely resembling the unique qualities of whichever 
artist(s) and/or genre(s) the user selects.48 
This great leap forward is made possible by the use of neural networks 
called variational autoencoders (“VAEs”),49 which compress the cumbersome 
sequences of raw audio in lower-dimensional spaces where they can be 
efficiently processed without sacrificing structural perceptibility.50  The VAEs 
allow the audio to be analyzed at multiple compression levels51 to develop a 
holistic understanding of what is occurring in the music.52 
Once the model has learned about the distribution of musical elements in 
these compressed spaces, it approximates how they would be arranged in a 
new sample and rebuilds them from the ground up.53  In other words, the 
model reacts to the user’s inputs (i.e., artist, style, genre, etc.) by predicting 
how the respective musical elements should be redistributed, thereby 
generating a sample that is subsequently refined in stages from low-to-high 
levels of musical detail (“up-sampling”).54  Once the code is up-sampled to its 
most detailed level of musical abstraction, it is decoded back into raw audio, 
resulting in a new song containing the user’s desired qualities.55 
In sum, when a generative model is engaged to make a new work, the audio 
that manifests as output is merely a tapestry of up-sampled sound recording 
fragments manipulated to resemble something ostensibly novel.56  Thus, 
characterizing the AI generator’s output as “original” is misleading, because 
doing so disregards the role that reproduction of copyrighted works plays in 
generating the sample.  Accordingly, we must assess whether the mechanics of 
machine-learning music generators can be reconciled with the protections 
                                                                                                                                      
pianos on basic functions such as which keys to strike and for how long, MIDI signals can 
only provide electronic instruments with basic instructions like pitch, duration, and velocity. 
Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 See Nicholson, supra note 25 (explaining that VAEs “are capable of both 
compressing data like an autoencoder and synthesizing data like a GAN”). 
 50 Jukebox, supra note 46; see also Devin Coldewey, OpenAI’s New Experiments in 
Music Generation Create an Uncanny Valley Elvis, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 30, 2020), 
https://techcrunch.com/2020/04/30/openais-new-experiments-in-music-generation-create-
an-uncanny-valley-elvis/. 
 51 Coldewey, supra note 50. At the first compression level (8x), the encoded audio still 
possesses a relatively high degree of detail. The second compression level (32x) retains less 
quality than the first, and the third level (128x) only retains the most basic musical 
information. Id. 
 52 Jukebox, supra note 46. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
2021] Sounds of Science 193 
afforded creative authors under the Copyright Act.  Part II will describe the 
two copyright interests attached to every song and how their infringements are 
adjudicated. 
II. COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT OF MUSICAL WORKS & SOUND 
RECORDINGS 
The Copyright Act provides for nine distinct categories of copyrightable 
subject matter.57  Section 102(a)(2) sets forth the “musical work” category, 
which includes a song’s basic structural elements, such as chord progression, 
melody, and “any accompanying words.”58  Section 102(a)(7) provides for the 
“sound recording” category,59 which applies only to fixed sounds (e.g., an 
artist’s recorded performance of a musical work).60  Thus, unlike any other 
form of creative expression, recorded music is unique in that each song 
necessarily contains two forms of copyrightable subject matter.61  Despite their 
interrelated natures, this distinction suggests that assessing alleged 
infringements of a given song may not entail the same analytical approach for 
both copyrights, nor will the respective analyses necessarily arrive at the same 
conclusion.62 
Among the most basic rights reserved to the copyright owner is the 
reproduction right.63  This fundamental feature of our copyright laws 
constitutes one of the simplest tools we employ to realize the flourishing 
creative society envisioned under the Constitution.64  To find infringement of 
the reproduction right, a plaintiff must (1) prove ownership of a valid 
copyright, and (2) establish that the defendant “copied” the work at issue.65 
                                                          
 57 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1990). 
 58 Id. § (a)(2). 
 59 Id. § (a)(7). 
 60 See id. § 101 (defining a “sound recording” as “the fixation of a series of musical, 
spoken, or other sounds”). 
 61 Copyrightable Subject Matter, DIG. MEDIA L. PROJECT (Jan. 22, 2021), 
https://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/copyrightable-subject-matter. 
 62 See Oren Bracha, Not De Minimis: (Improper) Appropriation in Copyright, 68 AM. 
U. L. REV. 139, 147 (2018) (explaining that “one cannot infringe the sound recording 
copyright – as opposed to the copyright in the underlying musical composition – by 
recording an independent version of the song, no matter how similar to the original 
recording the new version is”). 
 63 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (providing for the copyright owner’s exclusive right to 
reproduce his work in copies or phonorecords). 
 64 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (seeking “[t]o promote the progress of science and 
useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their 
respective writings and discoveries”). 
 65 Sid & Marty Krofft TV Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1162 (9th 
Cir. 1977). 
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To establish copying by the defendant, the plaintiff must prove not only that 
his work was copied,66 but that the alleged copying constitutes an improper 
appropriation of the work.67  Unfortunately, the improper appropriation aspect 
of the infringement inquiry is often conflated with the substantial similarity 
analysis conducted to assess actual copying.68  Judge Learned Hand’s 1930 
“abstractions test” best illustrates the essence of improper appropriation.69  The 
abstractions test explains that, in every work, there is a spectrum of protectable 
expression ranging from that which is undeniably protected by a copyright in 
the work (e.g., a uniquely constructed scene in a film, or a particular piece of 
dialogue), to that which is so general it merely constitutes the author’s ideas 
(e.g., common themes in stories, like overcoming adversity to find love, 
wealth, etc.), which have never fallen within copyright’s purview.70  Since 
1930, new technologies and categories of copyrightable subject matter have 
challenged this approach to analyzing improper appropriations based on levels 
of abstraction, but the analysis nonetheless still attempts to honor this 
principle.71 
Thus, the reproduction right is not absolute.  The Second Circuit has noted 
that “trivial copying is a significant part of modern life. Most honest citizens in 
the world engage . . . in trivial copying that . . . would technically constitute a 
violation of the law.”72  Additionally, many forms of admitted “copying” fall 
                                                          
 66 See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (explaining that answering 
the question of whether the plaintiff’s work was copied, in the first analysis, may be shown 
directly, via admission, or circumstantially, by a sufficient showing of the defendant’s (1) 
access to the plaintiff’s work, combined with the existence of (2) substantial similarities 
between the original work and the alleged copy). 
 67 Id. 
 68 See Mark A. Lemley, Our Bizarre System for Proving Copyright Infringement, 57 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 719, 720–21 (2010) (explaining that the substantial similarity inquiry 
conducted to establish improper appropriation is often misunderstood by courts to be a 
generalized substantial similarity analysis, which misses the purpose of the inquiry, i.e., to 
ascertain whether what was copied was unlawful). 
 69 See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (explaining 
that “[u]pon any work, . . . a great number of patterns of increasing generality will fit 
equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more 
than the most general statement of what the play is about, and at times might consist only of 
its title; but there is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, 
since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his ‘ideas,’ to which, apart from 
their expression, his property is never extended.”). 
 70 Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1990) (stating that copyright protection does not 
“extend to any idea, . . . regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, 
illustrated, or embodied in such work”). 
 71 See, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706–10 (2d Cir. 
1992) (articulating the “abstraction-filtration-comparison” test to assess substantial 
similarity in alleged software copying). 
 72 Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 173 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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within the bounds of exceptions that permit innocent reproductions which, if 
restricted, would not promote the utilitarian purposes of copyright.73 
The subsections that follow will focus on an exception to the copyright 
owner’s exclusive rights known as de minimis use.  De minimis is a principle 
premised on the idea that “the law does not concern itself with trifles.”74  To be 
used sparingly, de minimis seeks to avoid the pursuit of trivial claims and 
enforcement of their potentially disproportionate penalties.75  It is difficult to 
ascertain exactly what “trifles” are when considering the de minimis 
exception.76  Applied to music, this has generally meant appropriations of 
short, unrecognizable musical segments.77  However, as the subsections that 
follow will demonstrate, courts have taken inconsistent approaches to de 
minimis musical work and sound recording uses.78 
Courts still have yet to weigh in on the legality of AI music generator 
outputs, but the case law on de minimis uses of musical works and sound 
recordings is instructive.79  Subsection A will focus on de minimis uses of 
musical works to explain that there is a well-established de minimis exception 
for unrecognizable musical composition appropriations.  Next, subsection B 
will examine de minimis uses of sound recordings to explain that, here, courts 
are split; however, there has historically been a jurisprudential tendency toward 
“sound recording exceptionalism.”80 
                                                          
 73 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1990) (describing the fair use doctrine—a multi-factor test 
used to determine whether a particular use, on balance, should be deemed permissible in 
light of the goals of copyright). 
 74 Bracha, supra note 62, at 158. 
 75 See id. (explaining that “de minimis . . . corrects on the margin, an unfortunate side 
effect of the generality of legal rules: the fact that in a small subset of cases that fall within 
the ambit of such rules the cost of enforcement so overwhelmingly outweighs its benefit that 
enforcing the rules will be clearly detrimental.”). 
 76 See 4 M. B. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A][2] (2020) 
(introducing the concept of “fragmented literal similarity”). The leading treatise on 
copyright explains that, where literal similarities exist, there is no need to consider levels of 
abstraction, because literal similarities necessarily entail the expression of ideas.  Instead, 
the question becomes whether such similarities are substantial enough to constitute an 
infringement. Id. 
 77 See Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 434 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986) (observing that “meager 
and fragmentary” takings are de minimis where the “average audience would not recognize 
the appropriation”). 
 78 See infra Part II. 
 79 See supra Part I.B (describing how the process by which AI music generators create 
new works is necessarily dependent on the reproduction of potentially unrecognizable sound 
recording fragments). 
 80 See Bracha, supra note 62, at 145 (defining sound recording exceptionalism as the 
proposition that “copyright in recorded sounds is unique because, unlike copyright in any 
other subject matter, it is infringed upon copying with no additional requirement of 
improper appropriation.”) (quoting Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 
792, 800–01 (6th Cir. 2005)). 
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A. Musical Works 
The copyright in a musical work protects the essence of the song.  Broadly 
speaking, just twelve notes constitute the building blocks of every composition 
we know,81 from Beethoven to the Beatles.  An inherently limited musical 
palette means that composers must often make use of the same compositional 
elements, such as chord progressions, rhythms, and common melodic 
intervals.82  Thus, while musical work copyrights will be conferred upon 
multiple compositions containing many of the same musical themes, protection 
cannot extend to every constituent element of a given song.83 
Accordingly, the nature of musical works makes assessing substantial 
similarity essential to the infringement inquiry.  For instance, granting a 
monopoly to one composer over a three-note melody, without more, would 
unduly constrain the public’s ability to utilize an already limited selection of 
notes in subsequent compositions.84  Therefore, when generic features of a 
work are used without authorization, the de minimis exception would likely 
serve to permit such uses as non-infringing.85  The difficulty is determining 
where to draw the line between de minimis and substantial appropriations.86 
The Ninth Circuit articulated an approach to de minimis uses of 
compositions that attempts to sensibly capture the intended scope of protection 
in a musical work copyright.87  The rule provides that the de minimis inquiry 
turns on whether the average audience would recognize the appropriation.88  In 
Fisher v. Dees, a parodist appropriated six bars of music, constituting the main 
                                                          
 81 ALLEN FORTE, TONAL HARMONY IN CONCEPT AND PRACTICE 4–5 (Holt et al., 3d ed. 
1979). 
 82 See Alan White, 73 Songs You Can Play with the Same Four Chords, BUZZFEED 
(Apr. 29, 2014), https://www.buzzfeed.com/alanwhite/73-songs-you-can-play-with-the-
same-four-chords (listing dozens of famous pop songs premised on the same chord 
progression). 
 83 See Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678–79 (1st Cir. 1967) 
(explaining that allowing one party to copyright a “handful of forms” could exhaust all 
possible future use). 
 84 See id. at 679 (refusing to recognize copyright as “a game of chess in which the 
public can be checkmated.”). 
 85 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 76, at § 13.03[A][2][a] (explaining that, in the 
literary realm, “[o]rdinarily, the importance of but one line . . . would be regarded as de 
minimis, not justifying a finding of substantial similarity.”). 
 86 See id. (noting that “[n]o easy rule of thumb can be stated as to the quantum of 
fragmented literal similarity permitted without crossing the line of substantial similarity.”). 
 87 See generally Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 434 (9th Cir. 1986); see generally 
Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 88 See Fisher 794 F.2d at 434 n.2 (noting that “a taking is considered de minimis only if 
it is so meager and fragmentary that the average audience would not recognize the 
appropriation.”). 
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theme from the plaintiffs’ composition.89  The court roundly rejected the 
parodist’s de minimis defense, reasoning that the appropriation would be 
immediately recognizable to those familiar with the original work.90  Thus, the 
appropriated segment, however brief, was substantial enough to disqualify the 
parodist from de minimis protection.91 
By contrast, Newton v. Diamond defined the opposite boundary to the Ninth 
Circuit’s recognition standard.92  In Newton, the court had to determine 
whether use of a licensed sound recording sample also required a license for its 
underlying musical work.93  Defendants were members of the hip-hop group 
Beastie Boys, who sampled a six-second, three-note segment from a jazz 
record.94  Beastie Boys properly obtained a license to sample the sound 
recording from the relevant copyright owner (ECM Records), but the 
plaintiff—jazz flutist James Newton —alleged infringement of his copyright in 
the underlying musical work.95 
Conceptually, it is difficult to distinguish between performative and 
compositional elements.  The court could not consider Newton’s unique 
performance style in its analysis, because the sole basis for the infringement 
claim was Beastie Boys’ unauthorized use of the composition.96  Ironically, 
Newton’s experts actually undermined his case by focusing on his technique, 
instead of the song’s generic score.97  When stripped of Newton’s performative 
contributions, the segment of allegedly appropriated composition merely 
amounted to two distinct notes, a single scale-degree apart, alternated over a 
sustained C note.98 
Having determined the nature of Newton’s musical work copyright, the 
court was left to decide whether Beastie Boys’ unauthorized appropriation was 
substantial enough to sustain the infringement claim.99  Quantitatively, very 
little had been appropriated – the segment constituted just three notes in a score 
                                                          
 89 Id. at 434. 
 90 See id. at 434 n.2 (explaining that a parodist’s purposes would not be achieved by 
appropriating anything less than a portion substantial enough to conjure thoughts of the 
original work in the listener’s mind). 
 91 Id. at 434, 440. 
 92 Newton, 388 F.3d at 1190. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at 1191. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. at 1193–94. 
 97 See id. at 1194 (noting how Newton’s experts conceded the point that improvisational 
styles like jazz often contain simple, sparsely scored compositions, because it is assumed 
that performers will take creative liberties in their performances). 
 98 See id. (explaining that the scope of Newton’s copyright extends only to the 
“elements that he fixed in a tangible medium – those that he wrote on the score.”). 
 99 Id. 
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that called for “between 180 and 270 seconds of improvisation.”100  
Qualitatively, the court found that there was nothing distinctive about this 
segment of the composition relative to the rest of the score.101   Therefore, the 
court held that Beastie Boys’ use of the composition was de minimis, because 
“an average audience would not discern Newton’s hand as a composer, . . . 
from Beastie Boys’ use of the sample.”102 
Fisher and Newton nicely delineate the parameters of the Ninth Circuit’s de 
minimis recognition standard as applied to musical works.103  However, the 
copyright law’s long-standing requirement of demonstrating substantial 
similarities in infringement inquiries makes the foregoing cases more 
illustrative than controversial.104  Nonetheless, technological progress routinely 
calls into question the utility of well-established copyright doctrines.105  
Accordingly, the next subpart will examine the de minimis exception’s 
compatibility with one such development in the narrative of copyright law: 
digital sampling of sound recordings. 
B. Sound Recordings 
The Copyright Act has provided for federal protection of sound recordings 
since 1972.106  Congress recognized a need to curtail the piracy of 
phonorecords, which at the time contributed to an estimated loss of 
approximately one-third of all legitimate tape sales value on an annualized 
                                                          
 100 Id. at 1195. 
 101 See id. at 1196 (relying on the Beastie Boys’ expert’s testimony, which concluded 
that “the compositional elements of the sampled section do not represent the heart or the 
hook of the ‘Choir’ composition, but rather are ‘simple, minimal and insignificant.’”). 
 102 Id. 
 103 Compare Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 434 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986) (rejecting that six bars 
of music were de minimis: “a taking is considered de minimis only if it is so meager and 
fragmentary that the average audience would not recognize the appropriation”), with 
Newton, 388 F.3d at 1195–96 (establishing that the segment constituted just three notes in a 
score that called for “between 180 and 270 seconds of improvisation,” which does “not 
represent the heart or the hook of the ‘Choir’ composition, but rather are ‘simple, minimal 
and insignificant.’”). 
 104 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 76, at § 13.03[A][2][b] (2020) (explaining that 
the “traditional standards of copyright law – which, for decades prior to adoption of the 
1976 Act and unceasingly in the decades since, has included the requirement of substantial 
similarity.”). 
 105 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 417–18 
(1984) (questioning established notions of secondary liability in the context of a new 
technology capable of “substantial non-infringing uses.”). 
 106 See Sound Recording Amendment Act, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971) 
(amending the Copyright Act to extend protection against “unauthorized duplication and 
piracy of sound recording, and for other purposes.”). 
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basis.107  Further, phonorecord piracy translated into devastating losses for 
performers, musicians, and those who relied on the tax revenue it displaced.108 
Remarkably, this momentous addition to the copyright laws came barely a 
decade before the birth of hip-hop music, which made an art form out of sound 
recording appropriation.109  By the late 1980s, hip-hop artists were using 
widely available digital sampling110 equipment to create collages of sound 
from potentially hundreds of pre-existing sound recordings.111  Some have 
described this practice as born out of necessity.112  Others have questioned 
digital sampling’s artistic merits, arguing it is simply lazy authorship.113 
Regardless of one’s personal attitude toward sound recording appropriation as 
an artform, history has demonstrated that digital sampling is a phenomenon 
that is here to stay.114 
The ubiquity of digital sampling in the 1980s posed new legal challenges 
that continue to vex courts and legal scholars.  As an initial matter, the 
Copyright Act does not extend the same scope of exclusive rights to sound 
recordings as it does to other forms of copyrightable subject matter,115 nor does 
it prohibit third parties from imitating sound recordings so long as the new 
sounds are independently fixed.116  In other words, a copyrighted sound 
recording cannot be infringed by imitation, unless it is the actual sounds 
                                                          
 107 H.R. REP. NO. 92-487, at 1–2 (1971). 
 108 Id. at 2. 
 109 See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical Borrowing, 
Copyright and Cultural Context, 84 N.C. L. REV. 547, 558 (2006) (defining hip-hop as a 
musical style that uses rhythmic backgrounds characterized by manipulation of pre-existing 
recordings). 
 110 See Mary B. Percifull, Digital Sampling: Creative or Just Plain “CHEEZ-OID?”, 42 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1263, 1263 (1992) (describing “digital sampling” as a process 
whereby “sounds are taken from a source, either live or recorded,” such that “[a] musician 
can use a library of samples to create virtually any type of recording instead of hiring 
individual instrumentalists to play each part.”). 
 111 Julian Azran, Bring Back the Noise: How Cariou v. Prince Will Revitalize Sampling, 
38 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 69, 72 (2014). 
 112 See Melissa Eckhause, Digital Sampling v. Appropriation Art: Why Is One Stealing 
and the Other Fair Use? A Proposal for a Code of Best Practices in Fair Use for Digital 
Music Sampling, 84 MO. L. REV. 371, 378–79 (2019) (explaining that artists who digitally 
sampled often did so because they lacked the resources to obtain instruments, music lessons, 
and the technical know-how to recreate the sounds they sought to emulate). 
 113 See COPYRIGHT CRIMINALS, (PBS 2009) (containing an interview with acclaimed 
music producer Steve Albini in which he characterizes sampling as “lazy and uncool.”). 
 114 See Robert M. Szymanski, Audio Pastiche: Digital Sampling, Intermediate Copying, 
Fair Use, 3 U.C.L.A. ENT. L. REV. 271, 278 (1996) (describing digital sampling as “so 
pervasive that many musicians and engineers . . . regard it as being indispensable in the 
music industry.”). 
 115 See 17 U.S.C. § 114(a)–(b) (1990) (limiting the exclusive rights in sound recordings 
to “the rights specified by clauses (1), (2), (3) and (6) of section 106”). 
 116 Id. at (b). 
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themselves that are reproduced or manipulated.117  This divergence from the 
scope of protection granted to other copyrightable subject matter has served to 
confound understandings of the traditional infringement analysis, which has 
long been interpreted by courts, scholars, and practitioners as turning on the 
existence of substantial similarities.118  As the cases that follow will 
demonstrate, courts have struggled to establish consistent legal standards that 
satisfy the respective interests of copyright owners and those who rely on 
digital sampling. 
1. Grand Upright Music, Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records 
The first case to address digital sound recording sampling was Grand 
Upright Music, Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records (“Grand Upright”) in 1991.119  
In Grand Upright, the plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction against, inter 
alia, the rapper Biz Markie for his use of three words and a short digital 
sample of the plaintiff’s song “Alone Again (Naturally).”120  The Southern 
District of New York immediately characterized the defendant’s actions as 
theft121 and centered its analysis on establishing the plaintiff’s ownership of the 
song’s copyrights.122  Having found that the plaintiff held a valid copyright in 
the sampled sound recording, the court admonished the defendant’s actions, 
going as far as to recommend the matter to the United States Attorney for 
criminal prosecution.123 
The outcome in Grand Upright was a stunning vindication of sound 
recording exceptionalism.124  However, many have since criticized Grand 
Upright for its lack of reasoning on the copying prong in the infringement 
                                                          
 117 Id. 
 118 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 76, at § 13.03[A][2][b] (2020) (noting that 
influential digital sampling cases have called into question the notion that, “[o]n general 
principles, . . . digitally sampling prior music to use in a new composition should not be 
subject to any special analysis: to the extent that the resulting product is substantially similar 
to the sampled original, liability should result.”). 
 119 Grand Upright Music, Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991). 
 120 Id. at 183. 
 121 Id. (quoting the Old Testament’s prohibition on stealing in the Book of Exodus). 
 122 Id. at 183–85 (reasoning that the certificates of copyright and transfer documents, 
testimony of the acknowledged songwriter and first performer, and the defendant’s 
unsuccessful prior attempts to secure a license from the plaintiff all served as evidence that 
the plaintiff held valid copyrights in the works). 
 123 Id. at 185. 
 124 See id. (noting that the defendant’s conduct in this case not only violated the laws of 
the United States, but also the Seventh Commandment). 
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analysis.125  The court did not assess, for example, whether the relatively short 
sample met the qualitative substantiality requirement for unlawfulness.126  In 
other words, the court conducted its infringement inquiry without 
contemplating whether the work had been improperly appropriated; it was 
satisfied in its conclusion merely knowing that a portion of the work was used 
without authorization.127 
The lack of clear guidance in Grand Upright led artists and record 
companies to assume that negotiating a license was the safest approach to 
digital sampling.128  Cultural historians have lamented the case for how it 
served to dilute hip-hop’s authentic, spontaneous, and transgressive nature.129  
Another practical effect of Grand Upright was that digital sampling became a 
creative tool reserved only to those who could afford the high licensing fees.130 
Most digital sampling disputes today are resolved in private settlements, 
which deny courts the opportunity to provide more meaningful guidance.131  
However, two influential cases in the last fifteen years have revisited the issue 
and have offered nuanced assessments of what should occur in a sound 
recording infringement analysis.132  Unfortunately, the courts’ respective 
interpretations of the Copyright Act established contradictory legal rules, 
resulting in a circuit split. 
2. The Circuit Split Between the Sixth & Ninth Circuits 
After Grand Upright, de minimis use of sound recordings was not truly 
                                                          
 125 See Carl A. Falstrom, Thou Shalt Not Steal: Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner 
Bros. Records, Inc. and the Future of Digital Sound Sampling in Popular Music, 45 
HASTINGS L.J. 359, 362 (1994) (noting that the Grand Upright case had the potential to be a 
landmark decision but, in reality, is of little precedential value). 
 126 See id. Beyond the court’s choice to disregard this aspect of the infringement 
analysis, defendant’s counsel may have also contributed to the opinion’s lack of reasoning 
by failing to assert some common defenses. Id.  Had, for example, fair use been asserted, the 
court would have had to consider, inter alia, the substantiality of the portion copied. Id.  It is 
unclear whether a fair use defense would have changed the dispute’s outcome, but it would 
have at least forced the court to tease out its justification for ruling in a manner that 
effectively pulled the rug out from under digital sampling-reliant artforms. 
 127 Id. at 379 (noting that not all appropriation is wrong in the sampling context, and 
some artists just want to incorporate a particular sound into their music). 
 128 Azran, supra note 111, at 73. 
 129 See SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS & COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND HOW IT THREATENS CREATIVITY 143 (2001) (noting that, “[w]hat sampling 
did occur in the late 1990s was non-transgressive, nonthreatening, and too often clumsy and 
obvious.”). 
 130 Azran, supra note 111, at 73–74. 
 131 Percifull, supra note 110, at 1285. 
 132 See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 795 (6th Cir. 2005); 
see also VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2016). 
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reconsidered until 2005, when the Sixth Circuit decided Bridgeport Music, Inc. 
v. Dimension Films (“Bridgeport”).133  Bridgeport involved the use of a four-
second, three-note sample from the song “Get Off Your Ass and Jam,” by 
George Clinton, Jr. and the Funkadelics, in the rap song “100 Miles and 
Runnin’,” which was featured on the soundtrack to a film called I Got the 
Hook Up.134  The plaintiff record company, claiming ownership over the 
digitally sampled sound recording, argued that no improper appropriation or de 
minimis inquiry is necessary where the defendant does not dispute having 
digitally sampled a sound recording.135  The court ultimately agreed with the 
plaintiff and rejected the district court’s determination that the sample did not 
“rise to the level of a legally cognizable appropriation.”136 
The court focused on a literal interpretation of a single word in Section 
114(b) of the Copyright Act to support its conclusion.137  Section 114(b) states 
that the exclusive reproduction and derivative work rights in sound recordings 
“do not extend to the making or duplication of another sound recording that 
consists entirely of an independent fixation of other sounds . . .”138 By 
comparison, the parallel language within the Sound Recording Act of 1971—
codified in the previous version of the Copyright Act—did not include the 
word “entirely[.]”139  Thus, the court read the 1976 Copyright Act’s deliberate 
inclusion of the word “entirely” as suggesting that Congress intended for the 
sound recording owner to have “the exclusive right to ‘sample’ his own 
recording.”140  In other words, the court interpreted “entirely” to imply that 
Congress never intended exceptions for miniscule appropriations, because 
nothing short of complete independent fixation would satisfy a literal reading 
of the statute.141 
The thrust of the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning was that, unlike most other forms 
of copyrightable expression, even a seemingly negligible digital sample 
constitutes a taking of something valuable and must therefore be licensed.142  
                                                          
 133 Bridgeport Music, Inc., 410 F.3d at 793. 
 134 Id. at 795–96. 
 135 Id. at 798. 
 136 See id. at 797 (quoting the district court’s opinion, which conducted an improper 
appropriation inquiry in its analysis, unlike the Southern District of New York in Grand 
Upright). 
 137 Id. at 799. 
 138 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (emphasis added). 
 139 See Bridgeport Music, Inc., 410 F.3d at 800–01 (noting that the former 17 U.S.C. § 
1(f) did not extend the reproduction and derivative work rights to “duplication of another 
sound recording that is an independent fixation of other [sounds.]”). 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. at 801. 
 142 Id. at 801–02 (explaining that the decision to sample, rather than independently fix 
the desired sounds, implies that the sample adds value by either saving money on the cost of 
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The court explained that the essence of a sound recording is not the song, but 
rather how the various sounds exist within their fixed medium.143  Thus, a 
digital sample can be viewed as akin to a physical taking, because the sounds 
are lifted directly from the medium itself.144  In sum, Bridgeport further 
bolstered the notion of sound recording exceptionalism by establishing a 
bright-line rule: “Get a license or do not sample.”145 
Conversely, the Ninth Circuit announced a different rule regarding de 
minimis use of sound recordings when it decided VMG Salsoul, LLC v. 
Ciccone (“Ciccone”) in 2016.146  Ciccone involved the use of a single horn 
sample, lasting less than a second, from the song “Ooh I Love It (Love 
Break),” which was reproduced in Madonna’s hit song “Vogue.”147  
Madonna’s producer, Shep Pettibone, was involved in the recording of both 
songs.148  However, the plaintiff owned the copyrights to the sampled work, 
and alleged infringement against, inter alia, Madonna and Pettibone for their 
unauthorized reproduction of the .23-second horn blast from the plaintiff’s 
recording.149  Thus, the court had to decide whether it would adopt the Sixth 
Circuit’s bright-line rule from Bridgeport, or maintain the de minimis 
exception for sound recordings.150 
The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning involved a close, literal reading of the 
Copyright Act and its legislative history.151  First, the court noted that neither 
Section 102(a), nor Section 106 suggest an intent for differential treatment of 
sound recordings where de minimis copying is concerned.152 Second, a House 
Report with respect to Section 114(b) states that “infringement takes place 
whenever . . . any substantial portion of the actual sounds . . . are 
reproduced.”153  Thus, inclusion of the word “substantial” in the House Report 
persuaded the court that Congress intended for the de minimis exception to 
apply to sound recordings, just as it applies to other categories of copyrightable 
                                                                                                                                      
hiring musicians to recreate the sounds, or by enriching the quality of the new work with 
sound that can only be captured by reproducing the original recording). 
 143 Id. at 802. 
 144 See id. (distinguishing the concept of a physical taking from an intellectual one). 
 145 Id. at 801. 
 146 See VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that 
the de minimis exception applies to sound recording copyright infringement claims, just as it 
does to all other categories of copyrightable subject matter). 
 147 Id. at 875. 
 148 Id. at 874. 
 149 Id. 
 150 See id. at 880 (explaining that the plaintiff urged the court to follow Bridgeport’s 
bright line rule). 
 151 Id. at 881–83, 887. 
 152 Id. at 881–82. 
 153 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 106 (1976) (emphasis added). 
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subject matter.154 
The Ninth Circuit was not persuaded that Congress intended for sound 
recordings to enjoy a unique scope of protection.155  The court emphasized that 
substantiality of the portion copied is a well-established requirement for 
copyright infringement.156  Contrary to the Sixth Circuit’s view that something 
of value is taken whenever a sound recording is copied, the Ninth Circuit 
reasoned that a copier does not benefit from the original artist’s expression 
when the public cannot recognize the appropriation.157  Further, the lack of 
cases demonstrating adherence to Bridgeport (save for district courts within 
the Sixth Circuit that are bound to do so) bolstered the court’s belief that the de 
minimis exception should be applied consistently, even to cases of digital 
sampling.158 
Mindful that circuit splits should not be undertaken lightly, the court issued 
a fulsome rebuttal of Bridgeport in an attempt to justify its departure from the 
Sixth Circuit’s well-established—albeit non-binding—precedent.159  Contrary 
to the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of the word “entirely” in Section 114(b), 
the Ninth Circuit inferred that the abundance of limitative language in the 
provision (“exclusive rights of the owner of a copyright in a sound recording . . 
. do not extend . . . do not apply”) did not indicate an intent to expand the 
scope of protection for sound recordings.160  Further, the court was not 
persuaded by the Sixth Circuit’s distinction between physical and intellectual 
takings, which it reasoned could just as easily be applied to other classes of 
artistic works that have always been subject to the de minimis exception (e.g., 
photographs).161  Accordingly, the court was compelled to announce its own 
rule, in contravention of the Sixth Circuit.162 
The court admitted that an unfortunate effect of contradictory rules between 
the circuits is that copyright owners will enjoy different degrees of protection 
                                                          
 154 VMG Salsoul, LLC, 824 F.3d at 884. 
 155 Id. at 884–85. 
 156 Id. at 880–81 (citing 4 M. B. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 
13.03[A][2][a] (2020)). 
 157 See id. at 880–881 (explaining that the artist’s legally protected interest is intrinsically 
linked to the public’s appreciation for – and recognition of – the work) (citing Arnstein v. 
Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946)). 
 158 See id. at 881 (noting how Bridgeport is an outlier among courts that consistently 
apply the de minimis rule in copyright infringement cases). 
 159 See id. at 886 (acknowledging the likely unfortunate consequences of its decision but 
emphasizing that courts cannot be expected to blindly follow their sister circuits’ 
unpersuasive reasoning). 
 160 Id. at 883. 
 161 Id. at 885. 
 162 See id. at 886 (noting that “the goal of avoiding a circuit split cannot override [the 
court’s] independent duty to determine congressional intent.”). 
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depending on where they are located in the country.163  Regrettably, the 
inconsistent rules established in the foregoing cases divide two of the country’s 
primary music markets, which cannot be easily delinked: Nashville, under the 
Sixth Circuit’s jurisdiction; and Los Angeles, under the Ninth Circuit’s.164  To 
be clear, this subsection’s purpose is not to question the wisdom of Grand 
Upright, Bridgeport, or Ciccone.  Divining congressional intent from statutory 
language that may not have contemplated the particular activity at issue is no 
simple task.  Nonetheless, in the absence of further guidance from Congress, 
the inconsistent rules regarding de minimis use of sound recordings provide a 
shaky foundation upon which we must consider novel technologies that engage 
in increasingly pernicious forms of digital sampling. 
III. ANALYSIS 
Although research into AI music generation had already been ongoing for 
two decades prior to the enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act, it is unlikely 
that Congress envisioned machine learning as an approach to sophisticated 
music generation.165  The courts’ apparent inability to settle on a consistent 
reading of the Copyright Act with regard to digital sampling foreshadows the 
interpretive challenges that lie ahead in the AI era.166  Society’s tenuous 
understanding of Congress’ intent in Section 114(b) will once again be tested 
by the peculiarities of algorithm-based music generators, which can be fairly 
described as engaging in a form of digital sampling.167  Additionally, the 
variety of possible approaches to machine learning music creation168 will make 
it difficult to develop universally applicable, bright-line standards in this field. 
                                                          
 163 Id. 
 164 See Shirley Halperin, Study: Nashville, New York, L.A. Among America’s Most 
Music-Centric Cities; Detroit, Philadelphia Lag Behind, THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Aug. 
7, 2012), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/earshot/study-music-scenes-nashville-new-
york-los-angeles-detroit-358889 (finding Nashville and Los Angeles among the top five 
most music-centric cities, based on an analysis of regional concentrations of “musicians, 
music venues, and other industry businesses.”). 
 165 See H.R. REP. NO. 92-487, at 2 (1971) (seeking to curtail the “unauthorized 
reproduction and sale” of phonorecords) (emphasis added). 
 166 Compare Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 801 (6th Cir. 
2005) (interpreting Section 114(b) as granting the sound recording owner the “exclusive 
right to ‘sample’ his own recording.”), with VMG Salsoul, LLC, 824 F.3d at 883 
(interpreting Section 114(b) as a limitation on the copyright holder’s rights). 
 167 See Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 304–05 (2006) (citing Joanna 
Demers, Sampling the 1970s in Hip-Hop, 22 POPULAR MUSIC 41, 41 (2003)) (defining 
digital sampling as a “process in which pre-recorded sounds are incorporated into the sonic 
fabric of a new song.”) 
 168 See Jones, supra note 20 (outlining a variety of neural networks-based approaches to 
generative modeling). 
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However, even if courts can agree on where AI music generators should be 
situated within existing legal frameworks, there still remains the more 
troubling matter of AI’s potential impact on human authorship and the creative 
incentive structure.  The technology’s near-limitless generative capacity,169 
compounded by an enthusiastic movement advocating for the copyrightability 
of AI-made works,170 places human authors and the music industry in a 
precarious position.  Thus, the rapid pace of AI development makes it essential 
to articulate clear theories of infringement while the technology is still in its 
nascent stages.  In sum, AI’s seductive appeal must not distract courts and 
policymakers from the ramifications of rules that effectively devalue 
copyrighted works and the significance of human authorship.171 
Subsection A will describe how potential infringements in AI music 
generator outputs would be assessed in light of the de minimis use case law 
outlined in Part II.  The subsection will consider GANs and autoencoder-based 
approaches to AI music generation, demonstrating how application of de 
minimis principles will lead to different outcomes, depending on the approach.  
Subsection A will conclude by arguing that—regardless of the approach 
taken—there are sound policy rationales for disapproving the unauthorized 
reproduction of musical work and sound recording fragments in AI music 
generator outputs.  Finally, subpart B will propose policy alternatives that seek 
to reconcile the competing interests of AI developers and music copyright 
owners. 
A. Infringement  
Every sample used to construct an AI-generated song will implicate both 
music copyrights.  The various sound recording samples that constitute the AI 
generator’s outputs are inextricably tied to their underlying musical works, 
even if such uses are merely incidental.172  Therefore, two infringement 
                                                          
 169 See Dani Deahl, How AI-Generated Music is Changing the Way Hits Are Made, 
VERGE (Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/8/31/17777008/artificial-
intelligence-taryn-southern-amper-music (describing a recording that the AI music app 
Amper produced within a minute of being instructed to do so, and the “unnerving” thought 
that algorithms can make songs “in minutes”). 
 170 See, e.g., Bridy, supra note 10, at 400 (advocating for vestment of ownership rights in 
non-human authors). 
 171 See Dani Deahl, supra note 169 (speculating on the implications of “AI getting in on 
creative turf we categorize as distinctly human” to propose the question, “what does [AI 
music’s progress] mean for human musicians?”). 
 172 See Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that the case 
involved “use of a sound recording of a performance of th[e] composition[,]” indicating that 
every use of a recorded musical work performance will necessarily implicate the underlying 
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analyses must be conducted for each sample: one for the musical work and 
another for the sound recording.173 
The samples will manifest in the output to varying degrees—some might be 
obvious, whereas others could constitute even less than the .23-second horn 
blast at issue in Ciccone.174  Thus, ascertaining which samples are engaged, 
and whether such uses have been done to an unfair extent will guide the 
infringement inquiries.175  As the subsection that follows will demonstrate, the 
threshold of an unfair appropriation will vary from sample to sample, with 
several key variables influencing the outcome.  Although this analytical 
framework may be the truest method of assessing AI music in light of 
established precedent, there is more at stake here than the mere 
misappropriation of any given musical work or sound recording.  In the final 
analysis, courts and policymakers must also think critically about the future of 
AI music to ensure that the forest is not missed for the trees. 
1. AI Music Generator Outputs Under De Minimis Use Precedent 
The infringement analysis for musical work samples that appear in AI music 
generator outputs is consistent with the copyright law’s general approach to de 
minimis inquiries.176  The musical work samples are assessed for their 
appreciable compositional qualities,177 and the inquiry is confined to only 
those elements covered by the copyright in the musical work (i.e., melodies, 
rhythms, harmonies, and other structural aspects fixed in the score).178  
Ultimately, if the samples are found to be quantitatively and qualitatively 
insubstantial—i.e., unrecognizable to an average audience as having been 
derived from their original sources—then they will be deemed non-infringing 
                                                                                                                                      
musical work copyright). 
 173 See id. (acknowledging that an infringement analysis for a sound recording is distinct 
from the analysis for a composition). 
 174 See VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 879–81 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting the 
different pieces of the work that constitute infringements, including a .23-second horn 
blast). 
 175 See Newton, 388 F.3d at 1193 (noting that “‘[e]ven where there is some copying, . . . 
it must be shown that this has been done to an unfair extent.’”) (quoting West Publ’g Co. v. 
Edward Thompson Co., 169 F. 833, 861 (E.D.N.Y. 1909)). 
 176 See Bracha, supra note 62, at 158–69 (tracing the de minimis exception’s history and 
examining the ways in which courts have come to treat the doctrine as an alternate label for 
improper appropriation). 
 177 See Newton, 388 F.3d at 1193–94 (9th Cir. 2004) (filtering out the recording’s 
performative aspects from consideration in the infringement inquiry, because the 
composition was the sole basis for the plaintiff’s claim). 
 178 See id. at 1196 (adjudging the defendants’ use de minimis because the three sampled 
notes lacked any “distinct melodic, harmonic, rhythmic or structural elements.”). 
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de minimis uses.179 
Musical works are inherently less dynamic than sound recordings.  When an 
AI generator creates a song, it primarily does so by mining the sound recording 
for its performative nuances, rather than for the generic compositional 
structures in the musical work.180  To be clear, the AI model does analyze the 
musical works during training, generating valuable insights into how various 
styles of music are composed.181  However, comparatively little unique 
musical work value will manifest in the generator’s output, because the AI 
songs are constructed using short sound recording samples, which are by their 
nature more qualitatively dense than the associated segments of their 
underlying musical works.182 
Therefore, it is unlikely that a meaningful percentage of these musical work 
samples, standing alone, will be recognizable to average audiences.  
Nonetheless, Newton demonstrates that de minimis musical work analyses 
must be conducted on a case-by-case basis, as the various outcomes will turn 
on the unique facts of each use.183  Indeed, there may be plenty of instantly 
recognizable musical work segments that would conjure thoughts of the source 
work, even if the listener is merely provided with a generic rendition of the 
short sample’s notes, rhythm, and/or lyric(s).184  Simply put, only a holistic 
assessment of the individual musical work sample can determine the extent to 
which the original work was misappropriated. 
The infringement analysis for sound recording samples is less 
straightforward and will turn on a number of key variables.  First, it is 
important to determine whether the AI generator fixes its music independently, 
                                                          
 179 See id. (finding Beastie Boys’ use of Newton’s sample to be de minimis because “an 
average audience would not discern Newton’s hand as a composer, . . . from Beastie Boys’ 
use of the sample.”). 
 180 See Jukebox, supra note 46 (describing how recent AI music generators correct for 
prior models’ inability to “capture human voices or . . . subtle timbres, dynamics, and 
expressivity” by “model[ing] music directly as raw audio.”). 
 181 See id. (explaining how variational autoencoders encode music at multiple levels, 
including one which retains “only the essential musical information.”). 
 182 See, e.g., Newton, 388 F.3d at 1194 (highlighting the ways in which the plaintiff went 
“beyond the score in his performance” to “emphasize the upper partials of the flute’s 
complex harmonic tone,” which “is not explicitly requested in the score.”). 
 183 See id. (failing to establish a bright line de minimis use standard that would negate 
the need for a holistic analysis based on the facts of a given case). 
 184 See Jukebox, supra note 46 (providing examples of the Jukebox app’s “completions” 
function, through which the model generates a novel ending to a given song using the first 
twelve seconds of the original audio as a primer). For the first twelve seconds in a 
completion function, the source work is reproduced in its original form; from there, it is 
manipulated by the model to produce a novel ending, which often requires reproduction of 
the work’s recognizable musical elements to appear authentic. See id. (demonstrating the 
completion function using, e.g., The Eagles’ “Hotel California”). 
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or if it relies upon manipulation of the actual copyrighted sounds.185  For 
example, GANs-based AI systems entail a generator neural network that 
independently fixes the music in an attempt to outmaneuver the discriminator 
neural network’s authenticity detector.186  Alternatively, autoencoder-based 
approaches entail manipulation of actual copyrighted sounds to generate the 
music through the encoding and decoding process.187  In other words, how the 
AI system uses the copyrighted sound recordings will dictate the course of the 
analysis. 
If the AI system independently fixes the sounds that constitute the 
generator’s output, then there is simply no infringement of the sound 
recording.188  The limitation on the copyright owner’s exclusive reproduction 
right in Section 114(b) makes independent fixation a complete defense to a 
sound recording infringement action.189  This result may be no less disruptive 
for copyright owners in the grand scheme, but programming the AI model to 
somehow independently fix its output audio would ensure that, technically 
speaking, the AI music generator will not infringe any sound recording 
copyrights.190 
Conversely, if the AI system reproduces the actual sounds as output, then 
the analysis would turn on whichever circuit’s rule the court opts, or is bound, 
to follow.191  In the Sixth Circuit, a copyrighted sound recording fragment 
reproduced in an AI-generated work would be deemed an infringement, 
regardless of the sample’s substantiality.192  Here, Bridgeport’s bright-line rule 
                                                          
 185 See 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (limiting the exclusive reproduction right for sound 
recordings to “the actual sounds fixed in the recording.”). 
 186 Nicholson, supra note 25. 
 187 Autoencoder, supra note 30. 
 188 See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 799–800 (6th Cir. 
2005) (noting that the statutory protections do not extend to those materials that are created 
with wholly independent sounds, even if those sounds imitate the copyrighted sounds). 
 189 See id. at 800 (noting that “the world at large is free to imitate or simulate the creative 
work fixed in a recording so long as an actual copy of the sound recording itself is not 
made.”). 
 190 See id. at 799–800 (emphasizing how copyright protection for sound recordings does 
not extend to imitations); see also Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 
1988) (explaining that intent to imitate a sound recording is not relevant to the infringement 
inquiry, because copyright in a sound recording extends only to duplication of the actual 
sounds fixed in the recording); Fharmacy Records v. Nassar, 572 F.Supp.2d 869, 872 (E.D. 
Mich. 2008) (granting summary judgment to defendants in a sound recording copyright 
infringement suit, because the plaintiffs failed to establish that the sound recording was 
duplicated). 
 191 Compare Bridgeport Music, Inc., 410 F.3d at 801–02 (holding all sound recording 
appropriations to be copyright infringements, regardless of their substantiality); with VMG 
Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 880–81 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding there must be 
substantial infringement on the copyrighted material for there to be legal recourse for 
copyright infringement). 
 192 See Bridgeport Music, Inc., 410 F.3d at 801–02 (holding all sound recording 
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would serve to prioritize the interests of copyright owners over AI developers, 
in recognition of the value derived from the appropriated sound recording.193 
Alternatively, the Ninth Circuit’s rule would require the court to conduct a 
de minimis inquiry to ascertain whether the appropriation is recognizable to the 
average audience.194  The extent to which any given sample will manifest 
recognizably as output is unclear, because AI music generators could 
potentially utilize any number of sound recordings from their datasets to 
construct a single work.195  However, unlike the .23-second horn blast in 
Ciccone, the source of which was deemed unrecognizable once transplanted 
into “Vogue,” it is possible that AI-generated music could contain substantial 
samples if, for example, the model over-emulates a particular cross-section of 
its dataset.196 
Generative AI models that replicate their inputs are said to “overfit” their 
training datasets.197  AI developers generally seek to avoid overfitting.198  
However, some AI systems are deliberately developed for emulative 
purposes.199  For instance, consider OpenAI’s Jukebox app (“Jukebox”), which 
is designed to “generate[] music, including rudimentary singing, as raw audio 
                                                                                                                                      
appropriations to be copyright infringements, regardless of their substantiality). 
 193 See id. at 802 (explaining how samplers derive value from every appropriation, 
regardless of substantiality, in the form of cost-savings, efficiency, inimitable artistic 
quality, or some combination thereof). 
 194 See VMG Salsoul, LLC, 824 F.3d at 881 (maintaining a de minimis exception for 
sound recordings based on the notion that a copier does not benefit from another artist’s 
expressive content if the public cannot recognize the appropriation). 
 195 See Jukebox, supra note 56 (describing the Jukebox app’s dataset as containing “1.2 
million songs (600,000 of which are in English), paired with the corresponding lyrics and 
metadata”). 
 196 See VMG Salsoul, LLC, 824 F.3d at 883–84 (emphasizing that Congress’ intended 
scope of protection, as set forth in a House Report on Section 114(b), includes “any 
substantial portion” of the actual sounds) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 106 (1976)). 
 197 See Tushar Gupta, Deep Learning: Overfitting, TOWARDS DATA SCIENCE (Feb. 12, 
2017), https://towardsdatascience.com/deep-learning-overfitting-846bf5b35e24 (defining 
overfitting as a machine learning phenomenon wherein an AI model learns about the detail 
in its training data so well that it causes the output to perfectly mirror its inputs); see also 
Abraham Khan, Generating Pokémon-Inspired Music from Neural Networks, TOWARDS 
DATA SCIENCE (Dec. 14, 2018), https://towardsdatascience.com/generating-pokemon-
inspired-music-from-neural-networks-bc240014132 (describing overfitting in the context of 
music generation as “caus[ing] the output to sound nearly identical to one or more of the 
original songs.”). 
 198 See Gupta, supra note 197 (stating that “[o]verfitting is a major problem in neural 
networks.”). 
 199 See, e.g., Vlad Alex (Merzmensch), JukeBox by OpenAI., TOWARDS DATA SCIENCE 
(Nov. 6, 2020), https://towardsdatascience.com/jukebox-by-openai-2f73638b3b73 
(highlighting examples of the Jukebox app’s impressively accurate AI-generated versions of 
AC/DC and Nirvana recordings). 
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in a variety of genres and artist styles.”200  A cursory glance through Jukebox’s 
sample library reveals thousands of recognizable appropriations.201  Indeed, an 
AI music emulator would not perform its primary function if an average 
audience could not recognize what has been appropriated.202 
In sum, the outcome of a given infringement analysis will turn on several 
factors, including which copyright is at issue, whether the new sounds were 
independently fixed, which de minimis rule the particular court adopts, and 
whether the sample’s source is recognizable to an average audience.  Although 
consideration of the foregoing offers courts a practicable methodology for 
making sense of the copyright issues implicit in AI music generation, the 
multitude of consequential variables in each analysis rules out the possibility of 
establishing bright-line standards regarding generative AI systems.  Therefore, 
consideration of AI music’s broader consequences is warranted to ascertain 
whether sui generis legal standards best serve the goals of copyright in this 
domain.203 
2. Future Implications 
AI music generators are presently advertised as tools to supplement human 
creativity.204  However, anyone who has observed the pace of technological 
advance over the past twenty years can envision a future in which generative 
AI is more than a mere contrivance.  AI thought-leaders are already 
undertaking ambitious initiatives to further embed the technology into our 
daily lives.205  If taken to its logical extreme, AI could foreseeably produce 
                                                          
 200 Jukebox, supra note 56. 
 201 See Jukebox Sample Explorer, OPENAI: BLOG, https://jukebox.openai.com/ 
?song=787941133 (last visited Mar. 27, 2021) (containing thousands of AI-rendered 
recordings emulating popular artists and musical styles). 
 202 Cf. Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 434 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986) (explaining how “it would 
seem contradictory to assert that copying for parodic purposes could be de minimis. A 
parody is successful only if the audience makes the connection between the original and its 
comic version.”). 
 203 See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (stating that 
the Copyright Act must be construed in light of the Constitution’s goal of “stimulat[ing] 
artistic creativity for the general public good[,]” when technological change renders the 
Act’s literal terms ambiguous). 
 204 See Jukebox, OPENAI: BLOG (Apr. 30, 2020), https://openai.com/blog/jukebox/ 
(describing how OpenAI expects “human and model collaborations to be an increasingly 
exciting creative space”) (emphasis added). 
 205 See Alex Johnson, Elon Musk Wants to Hook Your Brain Directly to Computers – 
Starting Next Year, NBC NEWS: TECH (July 17, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/mach/ 
tech/elon-musk-wants-hook-your-brain-directly-computers-starting-next-ncna1030631 
(reporting on the AI research company Neuralink and its plans to create “symbiosis with 
artificial intelligence” by implanting neural devices into the human brain). 
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music more efficiently and intelligently than human authors.206  This 
prediction has sparked a fierce debate among musicians—some insisting that 
AI will usher in a golden era of creativity, while others begrudgingly brace 
themselves for what they believe to be human authorship’s inevitable 
demise.207 
The debate over the future of AI music bears a striking resemblance to the 
debate over digital sampling.  Digital sampling democratized the public’s 
capacity for creativity and paved the way for an artform that presently 
generates more revenue for the music industry than any other genre.208  
Concurrently, digital sampling served to trivialize the value of musical training 
and analog recording by allowing non-musicians to cheaply and easily create 
fashionable, salable music.209  Thus, it is not just shifting musical tastes driving 
hip-hop to predominance in the market; it is also the ease of production and 
low transaction costs enabled by digital sampling.210 
Similarly, AI could be a seed for human creativity.  Musicians and non-
musicians alike would have unprecedented access to insights from all of 
recorded music’s history and the means to produce immeasurable quantities of 
aesthetically pleasing music at the push of a button.  However, AI music that 
can pass for human authorship would likely have a chilling effect on the 
public’s willingness to pay a premium for human-made works.  Even if we 
concede that there are aspects of the human mind that AI could never fully 
replicate, an innately cynical market would, on balance, likely prefer AI music 
for its lower transaction costs.211  Accordingly, it would be shortsighted to 
assume that AI will have any less disruptive of an effect on the music industry 
                                                          
 206 See Chow, supra note 42 (quoting the musician Grimes on her prediction that AI will 
be “so much better at making art than us.”). This prediction is particularly noteworthy (and 
somewhat ironic) because Grimes is married to Elon Musk – one of the foremost authorities 
on AI. 
 207 Id. 
 208 See Patrick Ryan, Rap Overtakes Rock as the Most Popular Genre Among Music 
Fans. Here’s Why., USA TODAY (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/ 
life/music/2018/01/03/rap-overtakes-rock-most-popular-genre-among-music-fans-heres-
why/990873001/ (explaining that R&B/hip-hop surpassed rock as the most popular genre in 
the U.S. in terms of total consumption in 2017). 
 209 See Eckhause, supra note 112, at 379 (describing how “[t]he way that music is 
created . . . began to change . . . [i]n essence, anyone with a computer could be a 
musician.”). 
 210 See id. at 380. 
 211 See Denise Cummins, This is What Happens When You Take Ayn Rand Seriously, 
PBS: NEWSHOUR (Feb. 16, 2016), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/economy/column-this-is-
what-happens-when-you-take-ayn-rand-seriously (noting how “[m]odern economic theory” 
is based on the notion that rational agents are self-interested, and a market is “a collection of 
such rational agents, each of whom is also self-interested.”). 
2021] Sounds of Science 213 
than digital sampling did in the 1990s and beyond. 
The judiciary’s patience and musicological acuity will be tested as copyright 
owners turn to the courts for redress.  In the short term, the court system will 
be overwhelmed by countless infringement actions—reason enough to 
question the utility of applying case-by-case, fact-specific copyright doctrines 
to generative AI.212  However, once AI music generators evolve to the point 
that their outputs sound less like their inputs, and more like intelligently 
composed original works, traditional notions of infringement that focus on an 
appropriation’s substantiality will become insufficient to hold accountable 
those who make undetectable—but no less violative—use of others’ works.213 
The unsettled question of whether AI generated works are copyrightable214 
will greatly influence how humans are forced to adapt.  If AI-generated works 
are deemed protectible, the technology’s capacity for unlimited expression 
could turn composing and recording music into a veritable minefield of 
potential infringement claims, thereby disincentivizing human authors from 
creating at all.  Even if AI-generated works are not deemed copyrightable, the 
legions of AI works routinely thrust into the public domain could render 
human authors uncompetitive in the market. 
In sum, AI music’s promise veils a host of undesirable consequences.  On 
the surface, AI appears to directly serve the copyright system’s goal of 
expression maximization.215  However, the law’s low threshold for copyright 
protection is designed to incentivize creativity that is decidedly human.216  
                                                          
 212 See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 802 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(arguing for a bright line sound recording infringement rule, because adopting a de minimis 
analysis for digital samples would require “mental, musicological, and technological 
gymnastics” across “hundreds of . . . cases involving different samples from different 
songs”). 
 213 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 76, at § 13.03[A] (2020) (quoting Newton v. 
Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004)) (explaining that substantial similarity 
between the original and allegedly copied works is “an essential element of actionable 
copying” – “‘no legal consequences will follow from [copying] unless the copying is 
substantial.’”). 
 214 Compare U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE 
PRACTICES § 306 (3d ed. 2017) (explicitly stating the Office’s policy against registering 
non-human authored works), with Bridy, supra note 10, at 401 (justifying copyright 
protection on behalf of non-human authors, because copyright seeks to protect economic 
rights, not moral rights). 
 215 See David McGowan, Copyright Nonconsequentialism, 69 MO. L. REV. 1, 12 (2004) 
(describing the copyright system’s primary aim as “promoting production of expression,” 
which justifies many fundamental copyright doctrines, including the copyright term, and 
various limitations on the exclusive rights); see also Sara K. Stadler, Incentive and 
Expectation in Copyright, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 433, 433 (2007) (noting that the “primary way” 
the Copyright Act achieves its ideal aims is by “providing creators with the incentive to 
create and to distribute copies of their works to the public.”) (emphasis added). 
 216 See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (limiting 
copyright law and its protections to “original intellectual conceptions of the author,” 
214 THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY [Vol. 29.2 
 JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 
Thus, AI’s capacity to supplant human authorship should give us pause to 
reconsider encouraging its unfettered progress.  The next subsection will 
contemplate ways in which policymakers may strike an equitable balance 
between the competing interests of AI developers, copyright owners, and 
society at large. 
B. Policy Proposals 
If we concede, arguendo, that there is scientific and creative utility to AI 
systems capable of producing music as intelligently as humans, then we must 
be careful not to unduly restrict AI’s progress in the name of safeguarding 
authors’ rights.  Equitable doctrines such as the de minimis exception were 
intended to achieve this delicate balance on an analytical level, but appear 
woefully inadequate to do so in light of generative AI’s unique functionality 
and long-term ramifications.217  To be certain, AI developers would also be 
able (and likely) to assert fair use over their sampling practices.218  However, 
fair use’s equally fact-specific nature, and its overlap with factors already 
contemplated in the de minimis inquiry (e.g., substantiality of the portion 
used), make it unlikely that fair use will yield appreciably different outcomes 
or thread the needle of competing interests any more effectively.219 
Musicians typically begin composing and performing at an early age, when 
notions of their art’s commercial viability are often subordinate to the simple 
desire for a creative outlet.  This attitude persists among many musicians who 
are usually happy—indeed, flattered—to see their styles widely imitated; that 
is, until the artistic validation fails to yield a proportional financial return.220  
Sadly, recognition is not always tied to pecuniary benefit in the music 
business, and it cannot sustain the musician who requires financial security to 
                                                                                                                                      
implying a need for the human element in a copyrightable work). 
 217 Francesco Di Cosmo, Return of the De Minimis Exception in Digital Music Sampling: 
The Ninth Circuit’s Recent Holding in VMG Salsoul Improves Upon the Sixth Circuit’s 
Holding in Bridgeport, But Raises Questions of its Own, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 227, 228, n.12 
(2017) (“The de minimis defense is applicable when a defendant’s copying was so small and 
trivial that it should be allowed.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 218 Jessica Gillotte, Copyright Infringement in AI-Generated Artworks, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 2655, 2684 (2020). 
 219 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (articulating factors to be considered in fair use analyses, which 
are closely tied to de minimis considerations, such as substantiality of the portion used, and 
the use’s effect upon the potential market for the original work). 
 220 See PBS, Copyright Criminals, YOUTUBE (Jan. 30, 2021), https://www.youtube.com/ 
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continue creating.221  Accordingly, a mere right of attribution over samples 
used in AI music generation— however merited—would be of little practical 
value to copyright owners in this context.222 
Musicians are often deluded by the false belief that monetizing art is at odds 
with creative ethics and ideals.  An irony of the backlash to Bridgeport’s 
exhortation against unlicensed sampling was encapsulated in the Sixth 
Circuit’s insightful recognition that attitudes often “appear driven by whose ox 
is being gored.”223  The same rules that samplers bemoan for supposedly 
inhibiting creativity are amongst the strongest safeguards they may have 
against exploitation of their own works.224  Thus, notions of artistic purity and 
ownership rights need not be viewed as mutually exclusive.225 
Licensing skeptics also argue that the fees are prohibitive, but this is not 
necessarily the case.226  The Ninth Circuit noted in its opinion in Newton that 
Beastie Boys licensed the sample at issue for a mere “one-time fee of 
$1,000.”227  The Beastie Boys’ album Check Your Head, which contained the 
sample from Newton on the track “Pass the Mic,” peaked at number ten on the 
US Billboard 200 in 1992, indicating sales figures that would more than justify 
the $1,000 expense. 228 Further, licensing rates set according to fair market 
value reflect the notion that copyright owners merely seek fair compensation 
for use of their works.229  Indeed, an author who refuses to license would serve 
neither the copyright system’s nor his own interests.  Thus, a workable 
licensing scheme is, on balance, the best available solution to the AI music 
dilemma.230 
Nominal rates from work to work notwithstanding, the process of licensing 
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hundreds of thousands of works would be expensive, not to mention grossly 
inefficient.  Therefore, one solution is to establish a blanket licensing apparatus 
for AI music generator training and output.  AI developers—as well as other 
unforeseen parties looking to use numerous works in the future —would have 
a one-stop shop for securing the rights to any works included under the blanket 
license.  This model has been a longstanding practice in the music publishing 
industry, which utilizes blanket licensing to grant public performance 
permissions to various users on behalf of hundreds of thousands of authors.231  
Licensees would benefit from the system’s efficiency, and potential licensors 
would retain the right to control the inclusion or exclusion of their works.  On 
balance, blanket licensing would ensure that neither party’s proverbial ox is 
gored in the making of an AI song. 
Another potential solution is to restrict the AI model’s permissible pool of 
training data to works in the public domain and those voluntarily pledged to 
the system by copyright owners.  Many musicians have expressed tremendous 
enthusiasm for AI music and have committed themselves to ensuring the 
technology is accessible to all.232  Those who wish to see their works included 
in the AI system can grant permission through organizations like Creative 
Commons,233 which assist copyright owners with open licensing and 
dedicating their works to the public domain.  Naturally, this would drastically 
narrow the AI system’s field of possible training data, thereby diminishing the 
quality of its outputs.  Nonetheless, courts and policymakers must again ask 
whether AI music outputs that can pass for human authorship constitute the 
type of socially beneficial end that the copyright system seeks to incentivize.  
In light of the havoc that unchecked generative AI could wreak on human 
authorship, there are sound utilitarian justifications for not prioritizing the 
technology’s development over intellectual property rights and the human 
incentive structure.  Perhaps a less authentic-sounding AI music generator in 
the short term is simply the price society must pay to preserve the dignity of 
human authorship for the future. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
AI has captivated the world.  Far from Hollywood’s depiction of 
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emotionally intelligent robots, AI is merely a broad classification used to 
describe the field of computer science research that deals with a machine’s 
capacity to replicate human thought processes.  Nonetheless, the technology 
has tremendous potential to transform the way we think about tasks that have 
historically been considered innately human.  Aesthetically pleasing AI music 
generation is now possible thanks to advances in the subfield of AI research 
known as machine learning, which utilizes clusters of algorithms called neural 
networks to interpret and manipulate music in a variety of ways.  This 
phenomenon has copyright owners rightfully concerned, as AI music generator 
outputs are veritable collages of fine-grained sound recording samples. 
AI music generator outputs are peculiar subjects for infringement inquiries, 
because the copyrighted works at issue may only manifest to a slight extent, if 
at all.  Thus, courts are likely to interpret potential infringements in AI music 
generator outputs based on de minimis principles, which seek to draw the line 
between trivial and unfair appropriations.  The line of de minimis use cases 
regarding digital sampling is instructive.234  Digital sampling emerged in the 
1980s and proceeded to revolutionize the way music was produced and 
consumed.235  Courts have struggled to settle on a consistent interpretation of 
the Copyright Act with respect to de minimis uses of sound recordings, 
resulting in an unfortunate circuit split between two of the nation’s primary 
music markets.236  Further, de minimis analyses of musical work 
appropriations, which have become increasingly common in light of digital 
sampling’s ascendancy, entail highly fact-specific inquiries that are sure to test 
the musicological capabilities of courts and litigants in the years to come.237 
It is unlikely that Congress anticipated digital sampling’s ubiquity, much 
less AI music’s variety of digital sampling, when it last overhauled the 
Copyright Act in 1976.238  Nevertheless, de minimis case law provides a 
practicable framework in which courts may assess generative AI’s outputs.  
However, de minimis principles are insufficient to account for the anti-
utilitarian ramifications of permitting this novel technology.  Chief among 
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these consequences is the chilling effect that AI could have on human 
authorship.  Humans may find themselves helpless to compete in the market 
against the AI systems of tomorrow, which generate their wealth of musical 
know-how from the same human authors they are likely to displace.  
Accordingly, courts and policymakers must consider equitable, licensing-based 
solutions to promote a mutually beneficial AI music ecosystem for technology 
companies and copyright owners alike.  AI may indeed someday change how 
music is created and consumed for the better, but we must take care not to 
disregard the significance of the human element in our haste to realize 
technology’s promise for the future. 
 
